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ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE LIABILITY TO
NON-CLIENTS IN WASHINGTON: IS THE NEW
MODIFIED MULTI-FACTOR BALANCING TEST AN
IMPROVEMENT?
Sheryl L.R. Miller
Abstract: Most jurisdictions recognize a cause of action for legal malpractice against a
non-client only where the attorney-client relationship is formed to benefit a third-party non-
client. This rule generally operates to preclude an attorney's potential liability to a client's
adversary. Washington departed from the majority in 1992 in Bohn v. Cody, where the
Washington Supreme Court found that an attorney did owe a duty to his client's adversary.
Two years later, in Trask v. Butler, the supreme court modified Bohn's test for determining
attorney malpractice liability to third parties to conform Washington's law with the majority
of jurisdictions. This Comment suggests that the modified test improves the standard for
attorney liability by restricting the cause of action to exclude non-clients in an adversarial
position to the attorney's client. However, it criticizes the application of the test for its over-
inclusive, arbitrary, and impractical approach to the issue. The Comment argues that the test
should analyze the intent of the attorney-client relationship factually, rather than as a matter of
law, and should limit its threshold inquiry to whether there was an intent to benefit the non-
client.
Over the past several decades, attorney liability for legal malpractice
has gradually expanded.' In most jurisdictions, the traditional rule
requiring strict privity2 in negligence actions has given way, allowing
non-clients to sue attorneys for legal malpractice.3 Although attorney
liability to non-client third parties for the negligent provision of legal
services is not based on any single, consistent theory, liability generally
has been confined to those whom the attorney and client intended to
benefit through their relationship.4
In many jurisdictions, the predominant theory for determining whether
an attorney owes a duty of care to a non-client is the California multi-
1. See generally 1 Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 7 (3d ed. 1989);
Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 5.6.4 (1986). This Comment addresses only to whom
an attorney is liable for the negligent provision of legal services. It does not address liability that an
attorney incurs through other legal theories.
2. Privity is "an identity of interest between persons, so that the interests of the one is measured
by the same legal right as that of the other." Ballentine's Law Dictionary 996 (3d ed. 1969).
3. See infra part I.B-C.
4. Mallen & Smith, supra note 1, § 7.11, at 384-86. An attorney's liability for the breach of other
duties, rather than the duty of care, is not limited to those whom the attorney and client intended to
benefit. For example, when an attorney commits fraud, violates a rule of professional conduct, or
breaches a duty to disclose, it is irrelevant whether there was an intent to benefit the person harmed.
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factor balancing test.5 Washington's theory evolved from this test.6 When
applying the California test, courts weigh six factors to determine if the
attorney owed the non-client a duty.7 Courts utilize the first factor, the
extent to which the attorney-client relationship was intended to affect the
non-client, as an initial inquiry.8 While all six factors are balanced to
determine liability, because the intent-to-affect factor is a threshold
inquiry, a case will be dismissed if this first factor is not met.9 Where the
non-client is adverse to the client, however, courts generally will dismiss
the case and not impose a duty to the adverse non-client, even if the
intent-to-affect standard is met.'"
In 1992, Washington broke from the majority of states in Bohn v.
Cody." Applying the California multi-factor balancing test, the court
held that a borrower's attorney owes a duty to his client's adversary, the
lender.'2 Two years after Bohn, Washington adopted a modification of
the California test in Trask v. Butler.3 That case narrowed the test's
5. Id. § 7.11, at 382-84. See also infra part I.B.
6. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 840-41, 872 P.2d 1080, 1083 (1994).
7. See infra text accompanying note 41.
8. Meighan v. Shore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744, 755 (Ct. App. 1995); Stangland -V. Brock, 109 Wash.
2d 675, 680, 747 P.2d 464, 467 (1987).
9. See, e.g., Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 845, 872 P.2d at 1085.
10. See, e.g., Harrington v. Pailthorp, 67 Wash. App. 901, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992), review denied,
121 Wash. 2d 1018, 854 P.2d 41 (1993); Bowman v. John Doe Two, 104 Wash. 2d 181, 704 P.2d
140 (1985). The principle that an attorney ordinarily owes no duty of reasonable care to a client's
adversary is widely accepted. See, e.g., Fox v. Pollack, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532, 533 (Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that in real estate transactions attorneys owe no duty to unrepresented ac verse parties); Page
v. Frazier, 445 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Mass. 1983) (holding bank's attorney not liable to mortgagors for
negligent title examination as attorney was hired by bank and potentially conflicting duties precluded
liability to non-client); Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 589 (Mich. 1981) (stating that because
attorney owes no actionable duty to adverse parties, attorney owed no duty to physician sued by
client). See also Mallen & Smith, supra note 1, § 7.11, at 386-88; Joan Teshima, Annotation,
Attorney's Liability, to One Other Than Immediate Client, for Negligence in Co,2nection with Legal
Duties, 61 A.L.R. 4th 615 § 9[a] (1988), and cases listed therein. Other courts that have extended
liability to a client's adversary have done so in specific circumstances. For example, courts have
been more liberal when the attorney issued an opinion letter or similar certification directly to or
directed toward a non-client, Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Corcoran, Mallin , Aresco, 605 A.2d
862 (Conn. 1992) (buyer's attorney issued negligent title opinion directly to lender); when the
attorney held himself out as representing the non-client, Nelson v. Nationwide Mortgage Corp., 659
F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C. 1987) (attorney allegedly agreed to provide legal interpretation of agreement
after holding himself out as "the" settlement attorney); and when the attorney volunteered his
services, Simmerson v. Banks, 254 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. App. Ct. 1979) (buyer's attorney promised seller
to file financial statement but failed to properly do so). In Bohn, none of these circumstances existed.
11. 119 Wash. 2d357,832 P.2d71 (1992).
12. Id. at 367, 832 P.2d at 76-77. But see supra note 10.
13. 123 Wash. 2d at 842-43, 872 P.2d at 1084.
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threshold inquiry to a determination of whether an intent to benefit
existed. 4 In Trask, the court held that an attorney did not owe a duty to
the beneficiary of an estate where he gave negligent legal advice to his
client, the personal representative of the estate.' Although the
modification was a positive step in limiting malpractice liability to
situations where the attorney and client intended to benefit a non-client,
many questions regarding the modified test remain unanswered. Without
judicial clarification, attorneys will be reluctant to represent clients
where potential liability is uncertain.
This Comment argues that although Washington's modified multi-
factor balancing test has greatly improved the standard for establishing
attorney duties to non-clients, it has been applied in a way that does not
deter attorney negligence and which needlessly complicates the initial
inquiry. Part I describes the expansion of attorney duties to third parties.
Part II discusses the development of attorney liability to non-clients in
Washington. Finally, part III analyzes recent improvements in
Washington's modified multi-factor balancing test as well as its current
inadequacies. Specifically, it explains how the modified test emphasizes
the intent-to-benefit inquiry and, in the process, limits liability to adverse
non-clients. However, it criticizes the court for not applying a factual
analysis when determining the intent of the relationship and for
expanding the threshold inquiry.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF ATTORNEY DUTIES TO THIRD
PARTIES
While privity was gradually forgotten in other areas of negligence
law, not until the past few decades were courts willing to stray from the
strict privity requirement in attorney malpractice suits. 6 Traditionally, an
attorney-client relationship had to exist for an attorney to owe a duty of
care. 7 At present courts apply a number of theories to impose attorney
malpractice liability between an attorney and a non-client. 8 These
theories include doctrines implicit in the California multi-factor
14. Id.
15. Id. at 845, 872 P.2d at 1085.
16. See generally Mallen & Smith, supra note 1, §§ 7.9, 7.11.
17. Id. § 7.4, at 364.
18. See infra part I.B-C.
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balancing test, the tort of negligent misrepresentation, and third-party
beneficiary liability.' 9
A. Traditional Strict Privity Bar to Third-Party Malpractice Liability
Once a prerequisite to all negligence actions, the strict privity rule
dictates that without privity, there can be no duty owed to a third party.2"
Consequently, if no duty exists, there can be no breach and no cause of
action for negligence." It was thought that privity was necessary to avoid
limitless liability.22 However, to avoid harsh and arbitrary results, courts
eventually abandoned the requirement of strict privity in negligence
cases.23 Nevertheless, in cases involving malpractice liability to third
parties, privity has continued to be a controversial issue.
The U.S. Supreme Court first addressed the issue of altorney liability
to third parties in National Savings Bank v. Ward.24 In that case, an
attorney overlooked a previously recorded deed in a title search for a
client and, after the client defaulted, the client's bank tied to recover
against the attomey.25 The Court held that, absent fraud, collusion, or
unusual circumstances, lack of privity between attorneys and third parties
barred malpractice suits by non-clients.26 It reiterated that the obligation
of the attorney is to his client and not to a third party.27
While the privity requirement was first relaxed oui:side the legal
profession, the same rationale was eventually applied in the area of
attorney malpractice.28 The first case to diminish the priv ty requirerient
in a negligence case involving the provision of professional services was
Glanzer v. Shepard.2 9 In Glanzer, the court imposed liability for
misrepresentation on a public weigher who misstated the weight of beans
while knowing and intending that the buyer would rely on the misstated
19. Id.
20. 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 52 (1974).
21. Id.§ 51.
22. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402,405 (Ex. 1842).
23. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); Thomas v.
Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
24. 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
25. Id. at 195-96.
26. Id. at 199-200.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 746 (Pa. 1983); Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,
687-88 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962).
29. 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922).
236
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weight.3" The court imposed liability because the purchaser's reliance on
the defendant's representation was not only foreseeable but was the end
and aim of the transaction.3 The court distinguished Ward by noting that
the attorney in that case did not intend to serve the lender but only the
client-borrower.32
For over fifty years, Glanzer was as far as courts were willing to stray
from privity requirements in the professional services context. In
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,33 a lender was barred, due to
lack of privity, from suing an accounting firm for injuries resulting from
the lender's reliance on the firm's certification of the borrower's
financial condition.34 The Ultramares court distinguished Glanzer on
grounds of foreseeability in that, unlike the bean weigher in Glanzer, the
accountants did not know the specific person who would rely on their
actions. The court reasoned that extending liability to all third parties
who might foreseeably rely on an audit would cause accountants to be
liable in "an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class."36 Today, while strict privity no longer bars a non-
client from bringing suit against an attorney, it still exists as a defense in
a minority of jurisdictions.37
B. California Multi-Factor Balancing Test
California was the first state to extend an attorney's duties beyond the
traditional confines of privity.38 In Biakanja v. Irving,39 the California
Supreme Court held that a notary public who negligently drafted and
organized the execution of a will owed a duty to the sole beneficiary of
30. Id. at 275-76.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 276.
33. 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
34. Id. at 442-43, 447.
35. Id. at 445-46. While the accountants understood the balance sheets would be shown to others
in the course of business, the court found that the plaintiff was not specifically foreseeable to the
accountants. Id. at 442-43.
36. Id. at 444.
37. New York still requires privity for negligence actions against attorneys. C.K. Indus. Corp. v.
C.M. Indus. Corp., 623 N.Y.S.2d 410 (App. Div. 1995). See also Mallen & Smith, supra note 1,
§ 7.10, at 380-81; Douglas A. Cifu, Expanding Legal Malpractice to Nonclient Third Parties-At
What Cost?, 23 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 1, 6 n.31 (1989).
38. For a thorough description of legal developments in California following its break from
privity, see Meighan v. Shore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744 (Ct. App. 1995).
39. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958).
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the will.4" In reaching this conclusion, it applied a six pert multi-factor
balancing test which weighed the following factors:
[1] the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of the
connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered, [5] the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct,
and [6] the policy of preventing future harm.4'
Three years later, the same court applied the reasoning of Biakanja to
attorney malpractice in Lucas v. Hamm.42 In Lucas, an attorney who
prepared a will which violated the rule against perpetuities and restraints
on alienation was found to have a duty to the beneficiaries of the will.43
In applying the six-part test, the court, without discussion, eliminated the
fifth factor, the "moral blame of the conduct," and added another which
weighed the extent to which the profession would be unduly burdened by
a finding of liability.'4
The language of the test appears broad in that it extends potential
liability to those who an attorney intends to affect." Because an
attorney's job is to affect others, whether clients or adverse parties, this
test encompasses a large group of potential plaintiffs. Many courts have
emphasized the intent of the relationship, thereby transforming it into a
threshold inquiry. Unless this inquiry is satisfied, most courts will
dismiss the case and not weigh the remaining five factors of the test.46
Despite the language of the test, however, courts have been reluctant
to expand liability beyond intended beneficiaries.47 With intent to benefit
40. Id. at 17-19.
41. Id. at 19.
42. 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). This test determines only to
whom an attorney owes a duty of care. Other tests must be applied to determine whether other duties
are owed.
43. Id. at 687-90. The case held that the duty was not breached. Id. at 689-91
44. Id. at 687-88. See also Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483, 489 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting
Mallen & Smith, supra note 1, § 7.11, at 382).
45. Lucas, 364 P.2d at 687.
46. See, e.g., Goodman v. Kennedy, 556 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1976); Lucas, 354 P.2d at 687-89;
Meighan v. Shore, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 744,754 (Ct. App. 1995).
47. Patrick E. Braun, Comment, The Pelham Decision, Attorney Malpractice and Third Party
Nonclient Recovery: The Rise and Fall ofPrivity, 3 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 357, 370-72 (1983); Cifu,
supra note 37, at 9-10. There has been a trend in recent California cases which indicates that, in
addition to the intended beneficiary analysis, foreseeability is another test which could lead to
liability. However, there has been no such express holding. See In re Rexplore Inc. Sec. Litigation,
685 F. Supp. 1132, 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (attorney may be liable to third parties who are intended
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effectively established as the threshold factor, the number of potential
plaintiffs is greatly limited. This is because an attorney does not intend to
benefit all those he or she intends to affect.
For example, in Goodman v. Kennedy,48 the California Supreme Court
applied an intent-to-benefit standard when determining that an attorney
did not owe a duty to a non-client.49 In Goodman, the attorney
incorrectly advised his client, a corporation, that it could issue its stock
as dividends to officers and that the officers could sell the stock to third
parties without jeopardizing the corporation's exemption from federal
securities law registration." The court found that although the attorney
did intend to affect the ultimate purchasers of the stock, no duty existed
because the purchasers were not the intended beneficiaries of the
transaction.' It reasoned that an undue burden would be placed on the
legal profession if liability were imposed on attorneys for negligent
advice that adversely affected all those with whom their clients dealt. 2
According to the court, as attorneys became preoccupied with the
possibility of limitless claims, the quality of legal services would
diminish. 3 As a result of the disparities between the strict wording of the
test and its application, courts applying the California multi-factor
balancing test have been inconsistent in their reasoning: While
purporting to apply an intent-to-affect test, these courts in fact apply an
intent-to-benefit standard.
C. Alternative Theories for Determining Third-Party Attorney Liability
Although many jurisdictions have adopted the California test, 4 it has
been widely criticized as over-inclusive, ad hoc, and inconsistent. As an
beneficiaries or who are otherwise "foreseeable" plaintiffs); St. Paul Title Co. v. Meier, 226 Cal.
Rptr. 538, 539 (Ct. App. 1986) (attorney may be liable to foreseeable third parties for professional
negligence if liability is consistent with public policy considerations).
48. 556 P.2d 737 (Cal. 1976).
49. Id. at 743.
50. Id. at 740.
51. Id. at 743. Compare with Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901
(Ct. App. 1976) (holding that duty of disclosure, not duty of care, exists where attorney's advice is
intended to be relied upon by plaintiff).
52. Goodman, 556 P.2d at 743.
53. Id.
54. Mallen & Smith, supra note 1, § 7.11, at 383 n.5 (listing jurisdictions adopting California
test).
55. See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96, 99-101 (III. 1982); Guy v. Liederbach, 459
A.2d 744, 746-47, 750 (Pa. 1983).
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alternative to the California test and the strict privity doctrine, some
courts have applied a third-party beneficiary test. 6 Others have followed
the tort of negligent misrepresentation as set out in the Restatement of
Torts.
57
Under the third-party beneficiary test, the predominant inquiry is
whether the principal purpose of the attorney's retention was to provide
legal services for the benefit of the non-client third-party. 8 Once a duty
is established based on a third-party beneficiary theory, a cause of action
may exist in either contract or tort.5 9 When applying the third-party
beneficiary test, courts have emphasized that no duty can be found in an
adversarial setting. This is because, the attorney would owe a duty to the
client as well as to those whose interests conflict with the client's
60interests.
The tort of negligent misrepresentation imposes liability where one, in
the course of his or her business, supplies false information to another
who justifiably relies on that information and for whcse benefit that
information was intended to be supplied.6' Negligent m:.srepresentation
does not require privity.62 Although the Restatement definition requires
an intent to benefit in order to find a duty, some courts ignore this
requirement.63 Other courts hold that a duty arises where the purpose of
the action was to influence the plaintiff and harm was foreseeable.'
Although these interpretations impose broad liability, negligent
56. For a general discussion of the third party beneficiary test and those courts applying such a
test, see Mallen & Smith, supra note I, § 7.11, at 384-85.
57. American Bar Association & The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., I ABA/BNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct § 301:608 (1984 & Supp. 1990) [hereinafter I ABA/BNA Lawyers'
Manual] (listing those courts which recognize the tort of negligent misrepresentation). See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).
58. Mallen & Smith, supra note 1, § 7.11, at 384 n.8.
59. See, e.g., Pelham, 440 N.E.2d 96 (applying negligence standard after determining duty was
owed to intended beneficiaries); Guy, 459 A.2d 744 (applying contract theory to determine whether
plaintiffwas intended beneficiary of attomey-client relationship).
60. E.g., Pelham, 440 N.E.2d at 100; Flaherty v. Weinberg, 492 A.2d 618, 629 (Md. 1985)
(requiring plaintiffto plead facts supporting an inference that no conflict actually existed).
61. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (1977).
62. Id.
63. E.g., Raymark Indus., Inc. v. Stemple, 714 F. Supp 460, 468 (D. Kan. 1988) (finding that
negligent misrepresentation is "simply a 'lesser included' form of fraudulent misrepresentation" and
thus there is no intent-to-benefit requirement).
64. E.g., Home Budget Loans, Inc. v. Jacoby & Meyers Law Offices, 255 Cal. Rptr. 483, 486 (Ct.
App. 1989).
240
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misrepresentation is just beginning to be interpreted, and it is not yet
clear what impact this theory will have on attorney liability."
II. DEVELOPMENT OF WASHINGTON'S STANDARD: THE
MODIFIED MULTI-FACTOR TEST
Washington originally acknowledged attorney duties to non-clients
under both the California test and the third-party beneficiary test.66
Washington courts vacillated between the intent-to-benefit and intent-to-
affect standards. There also was no consensus as to whether a duty could
exist between an attorney and a client's adversary.67 To eliminate
confusion, the Washington Supreme Court in Trask v. Butler" combined
the California test and the third-party beneficiary test.6 9 It created the
"modified" multi-factor balancing test.7" This test is identical to the
California test except that "intent to benefit" was substituted for the
original "intent to affect" factor.7'
Washington first addressed the privity requirement in a cause of action
for legal malpractice by a non-client in Bowman v. John Doe Two.72 The
court held that an attorney does not owe a duty of care to his client's
adversary. 7 Bowman had sued the attorney who represented her son in
his petition for alternative residential placement away from his mother.74
She alleged that the attorney failed to adequately investigate the facts of
the case and misrepresented facts to the court.75 Although the court stated
that the allegations may have been true, it applied both the California
multi-factor test and the third-party beneficiary theory and concluded
that the attorney owed no duty to Bowman.76 The court noted two
65. 1 ABAIBNA Lawyers Manual, supra note 57, § 301:608.
66. Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 680-81, 747 P.2d 464, 467-68 (1987).
67. For example, in Bohn v. Cody, the court looked solely to whether there was an intent to affect
the non-client. 119 Wash. 2d 357, 365, 832 P.2d 71, 76 (1992). On the other hand, in Stangland,
despite the intent-to-affect language of the test, the court analyzed whether there was an intent to
benefit. 109 Wash. 2d at 681, 747 P.2d at 467-68.
68. 123 Wash. 2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080 (1994).
69. Id. at 842-43, 872 P.2d at 1084.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 104 Wash. 2d 181,187, 704 P.2d 140, 143 (1985).
73. Id. at 188, 704 P.2d at 144.
74. Id. at 182-84, 704 P.2d at 140-41.
75. Id. at 183-85, 704 P.2d at 141-42.
76. Id. at 182, 187-88, 704 P.2d at 140, 144. The court listed only the five factors detailed in
Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962). 104 Wash. 2d at
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reasons for its decision. First, it was concerned that imposing a duty to a
client's adversary would interfere with the undivided loyalties an
attorney owes to a client.77 Second, it was concerned that imposing a
duty would diminish the attorney's ability to achieve the most
advantageous results for the client.
71
After Bowman, however, the court dramatically expanded attorney
liability in Bohn v. Cody,79 establishing that an attorney can owe a duty
of care to a client's adversary.8" The court applied the California test and
focused on whether there was an intent to affect the non-client. 1 In
Bohn, the plaintiff lent money to her daughter, who was represented by
the defendant.82 The loan was secured by the daughter's property. During
the preparation of the loan, Bohn, who was unrepresented, met with the
defendant and asked him whether she would have absolute security in the
property as well as a "free and clear" deed." The defendant stated that he
represented only his client in the matter, but affirmed that the deed would
be free and clear of any liens resulting from the prior owner.8" However,
tax liens incurred by his client encumbered the property and, after the
loan transaction was concluded, the IRS sold the house. 85 After Bohn lost
her interest in the property, she sued the attorney on the grounds that he
breached a duty to her by not advising her that the tax liens existed. 6
Applying an intent-to-affect standard, the court denied the defendant's
summary judgment motion, holding that the defendant ni ay have owed a
duty of care to Bohn." The court stated that under the extreme facts of
the case, it would not be unduly burdensome on the legal profession to
182, 18748, 704 P.2d at 140, 144. However, as in California, subsequent Washington court
decisions included the sixth factor. See Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 680, 747 P.2d 464,
467 (1987).
77. Bowman, 104 Wash. 2d at 189, 704 P.2d at 144.
78. Id.
79. 119 Wash. 2d 357, 832 P.2d 71 (1992).
80. Id. at 367, 832 P.2d at 76. For a discussion of the adversarial nature or this relationship, see
infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
81. 119 Wash. 2d at 365-67, 832 P.2d at 75-77. Although the court recognized that liability was
possible under both the third-party beneficiary and multi-factor tests, it only ar alyzed the facts under
the latter. Id.
82. Id. at 360, 832 P.2d at 73.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 361-62, 832 P.2d at 74. It is unclear from the opinion whether the attorney actually
knew of the tax liens or even whether the court felt he should have known of fie tax liens.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 367, 832 P.2d at 77.
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impose a duty on the attorney. According to the court, the defendant
should have advised Bohn to seek independent counsel." It further stated
that once the defendant started to give an opinion to Bohn, he had a duty
to take reasonable steps to "tell the whole story."89
Relying on the broad duty imposed in Bohn, the plaintiff in
Harrington v. Pailthorp" brought suit for malpractice against the
attorney who represented his former wife in custody modification
proceedings.9 ' However, the court was unwilling to extend attorney
duties to litigation adversaries.' The plaintiff alleged, among other
things, that the attorney had failed to adequately investigate facts and law
and had ignored conflicts of interests between his former wife and their
children.93 Finding that the plaintiff and his wife's interests were
adversarial, the court found no duty under either the California test or the
third-party beneficiary test.94
In keeping with the more restrictive holdings of Bowman and
Harrington, Washington deviated from its original tests by creating the
modified multi-factor balancing test in Trask v. Butler.95 This new test is
identical to the California test except that the key inquiry is whether a
plaintiff was an intended beneficiary of the attorney-client relationship. 96
The court cautioned against holding an attorney liable to a non-client
88. Id.
89. Id. Under the facts in Bohn, Cody may have owed a duty to disclose under § 550 of the
Restatement of Torts or may have fraudulently concealed information under § 551. Under these
theories, an independent duty. separate from the duty of care, is imposed on individuals to disclose
certain information. A Washington court has never explicitly found an attorney culpable under these
two theories. If the court was imposing such a duty rather than a duty of care, applying the multi-
factor balancing test was inappropriate because a duty to disclose is owed independently whether or
not the defendant is an attorney and whether or not an intent to affect or benefit existed. Washington
should clarify that the multi-factor balancing test applies only to finding a duty of care on the part of
the attorney and that when finding other duties other theories should be recognized and applied. The
court did not discuss its departure from Bowman and today Bohn must be viewed as a limited
holding due to its facts and the court's use of an intent-to-affect standard. See infra notes 112-16 and
accompanying text.
90. 67 Wash. App. 901, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992), review denied, 121 Wash. 2d 1018, 854 P.2d 41
(1993).
91. Id. at 904, 841 P.2d at 1259.
92. Id. at 907-08, 841 P.2d at 1261.
93. Id. at 904, 841 P.2d at 1260.
94. Id. at 910, 841 P.2d at 1263.
95. 123 Wash. 2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080 (1994).
96. Id. at 842, 872 P.2d at 1084.
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where doing so would detract from the attorney's ethical obligations to
the client, or where there is a risk of divided loyalties.97
In Trask, the beneficiary of an estate sued the attorney retained by the
personal representative of the estate.9 Trask, the beneficiary, alleged that
Butler, the attorney, negligently advised his client to file a quiet title
action against Trask, to sell the estate's property at disadvantageous
terms, and to contest a probate proceeding seeking to remove his client as
personal representative.99 Finding that an attorney who represents the
personal representative of an estate does not owe a duty to the
beneficiaries of that estate, the court upheld summary jt.dgment for the
attorney.' The court declared as a matter of law that Trask was merely
an incidental beneficiary of the relationship between the attorney and the
personal representative.' Because the intent-to-benefit threshold was
not met, the case was dismissed.0
By modifying its test, Washington is the first state employing the
multi-factor balancing test to explicitly admit that it is applying an intent-
to-benefit standard.0 3 As discussed below, this new standard properly
limits the number of potential non-clients who can sue an attorney for a
breach of the duty of care. 4
97. Id. at 844, 872 P.2d at 1085.
98. Id. at 837, 872 P.2d at 1081.
99. Id. at 839, 872 P.2d at 1082.
100. This was in contrast to the position the court had taken previously. See In re Estate of
Larson, 103 Wash. 2d 517, 521, 694 P.2d 1051, 1054 (1985) (holding that because the personal
representative employs an attorney to assist in proper administration of the estate, the fiduciary
duties of the attorney also run to the heirs); Kelly v. Foster, 62 Wash. App. 150, 152, 813 P.2d 598,
599 (reviewing trial court decisions regarding legal malpractice claim by beneficiary against attorney
of executor without reviewing whether duty existed), review denied, 118 Wash. 2d 1001, 822 P.2d
287 (1991). Cf Washington Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 (1994) [hereinafter RPC] ("A
lawyer may reveal to the tribunal... any breach of fiduciary responsibility by a client who is a ...
personal representative .. ") (emphasis added).
101. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 845, 872 P.2d at 1086. See infra part III.B.1 (discussing the need to
look to factual specifics of each relationship to determine whether an intent to benefit the beneficiary
existed within the attorney-client relationship).
102. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 845, 872 P.2d at 1086.
103. Compare supra note 47 and accompanying text.
104. See infra part llI.A.
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III. WASHINGTON'S MODIFIED TEST ESTABLISHES AN
INAPPROPRIATE THRESHOLD INQUIRY
The Trask v. Butler modification of the multi-factor balancing test
created a dramatic change in Washington attorney malpractice law.' 5 As
the courts' focus shifted from intent to affect to intent to benefit,
attorneys' duties to non-clients narrowed. The modification of the multi-
factor balancing test was a positive step because it limited attorney
liability to non-adversarial third parties.
However, many problems still exist with the modified test. Until these
problems are solved, attorneys will not only continue to face
unpredictable and unjustified liability, but attorney malpractice cases will
become unnecessarily complex. Because meeting the threshold intent-to-
benefit inquiry is crucial to sustaining a cause of action, the remainder of
this Comment will focus on analyzing the application of that factor in the
modified test.
A. The Modified Test Cures Inadequacies by Establishing Intent To
Benefit as the Threshold Inquiry
Washington's original multi-factor balancing test applied an intent-to-
affect standard when determining to whom an attorney owed a duty of
care.0 6 This factor was inappropriate because, as all attorneys intend to
affect parties with whom their clients are doing business or engaging in
litigation, potential liability was limitless. 7 By abandoning the intent-to-
affect standard in favor of intent-to-benefit, the modified multi-factor
balancing test first articulated in Trask appropriately limits liability to
non-adversarial third parties.'
An attorney should owe no duty of care to a client's adversary. 9 If a
duty were imposed, in addition to conflict of interest concerns, the
105. 123 Wash. 2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080 (1994).
106. See, e.g., Stangland v. Brock, 109 Wash. 2d 675, 680, 747 P.2d 464, 467 (1987).
107. Although five other factors could have limited liability where the threshold was met, at times
these factors also were ineffective in limiting liability properly. An example is Bohn v. Cody, 119
Wash. 2d 357, 832 P.2d 71 (1992), where all six factors were balanced, and the court still imposed a
duty on an attorney to a client's adversary.
108. See supra note 10.
109. See generally Bowman v. John Doe Two, 104 Wash. 2d 181, 189, 704 P.2d 140, 144 (1985);
Adams v. Chenowith, 349 So. 2d 230, 231 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (noting difficulties in
representing both buyer and seller); Friedman v. Dozorc, 312 N.W.2d 585, 591-94 (Mich. 1981)
(stating that because attorney owes no actionable duty to adverse parties, attorney owed no duty to
physician sued by client).
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traditional attorney-client relationship would be permanently altered. At
present, an attorney owes a client an obligation of undivided loyalty and
independent judgment. The attorney's primary purpose is to earnestly
serve the client's interests."' A duty of care to adversaial non-clients
would limit an attorney's zealous and independent representation. The
attorney would become a neutral counselor. The adverse parties would
not be obligated to retain their own counsel, but instead could rely on the
adversary's counsel. Furthermore, out of fear of potential liability to
third parties, an attorney might feel compelled to counsel a client not to
proceed with a difficult or unique transaction. This would limit access to
courts as fewer attorneys would be willing to accept such cases. Because
of such considerations, most courts have recognized that an attorney does
not have a duty of care to an adverse third party."'
Bohn v. Cody".2 exemplifies the overbreadth of an intent-to-affect
standard." 3 Without acknowledging the adversarial relationship, the
court actually recognized that a duty may exist between an attorney and a
client's adversary." 4  Washington does not spec.ifically define
"adversary." However, under conflicts of interest rules, it is clear that
Bohn and her daughter had conflicting, and, therefore, adverse
interests." 5 Bohn's interest, as the lender, was in securing her money and
interest in the property. The daughter's interest, as the borrower, was to
finalize the loan with conditions favorable to herself. The attorney's
obligation was to arrange the transaction with the best possible terms for
110. An attorney should not materially limit his or her representation of a client by representing
adverse interests or incurring duties to another which would adversely affect th,.- relationship with an
existing client. RPC Rule 1.7. Furthermore, an attorney should act with reasonable diligence in
representing a client. RPC Rule 1.3. In addition, "[loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's
relationship to a client." American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Rule 1.7 cmt. at 105 (2d ed. 1992). Model rule 1.7 is substantially similar to Washington rule 1.7.
111. See supra note lO and accompanying ten t.But see infra note 114 and accompanying text.
112. 119 Wash. 2d 357, 832 P.2d 71 (1992).
113. See supra note 89 (discussing when intent to affect may be an appropriate standard).
114. Id. The majority position is that relationships between borrowers and lenders are adversarial.
See I ABAIBNA Lawyers' Manual, supra note 57, § 301:612. The court did state that Bohn's
interests were different from the client's and that the attorney must take an adversarial stance toward
Bohn to protect his client's interests. However, the court still failed to follow the conventional rule
that an attorney does not owe a duty of reasonable care to adverse non-clients. Bohn, 119 Wash. 2d
at 367, 832 P.2d at 77.
115. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; Page v. Frazier, 445 N.E.2d 148, 153 (Mass.
1983) (discussing various conflicts which may arise in representing both borrower and lender);
Wolfram, supra note 1, at 317 ("[The] lawyer must be in a position that all options that might favor
the client can be considered free from the likely impairment of any interests other than those of the
client.").
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his client." 6 Therefore, any duty on the part of the attorney to ensure the
security of Bohn's interest in the property would invariably conflict with
his duties to his client. However, the court applying the intent-to-affect
standard held that the attorney owed a duty to Bohn. Had the court
applied an intent-to-benefit standard this result could have been avoided.
The advantages of the intent-to-benefit standard also exist in litigation.
For example, in Harrington v. Pailthorp,"7 the relationship between the
plaintiff and the attorney's client, the plaintiffs former wife, was clearly
adversarial. If the court had applied an intent-to-affect standard, it would
have had no choice but to deny summary judgment."8 Because every
attorney involved in litigation intends to affect the adverse party, this
standard is automatically satisfied. As discussed above, finding a duty in
such a situation would have placed an immense burden on the legal
profession. An attorney cannot fully represent a client or offer undivided
loyalty when he or she potentially owes a duty of care to an adverse
party."f
9
The threshold inquiry in determining attorneys' duties of reasonable
care has been limited appropriately to intent to benefit in the modified
multi-factor balancing test. The term "adversary" implies a
confrontational relationship where neither party intends to benefit the
other. By limiting duties to non-adversarial third parties, the narrower
intent-to-benefit inquiry avoids the difficulties raised by the former
standard.
B. Application of the Modified Multi-Factor Balancing Test in Trask
Is Unsatisfactory
Although the modified multi-factor test was a vast improvement in
assessing attorneys' duties of care to non-clients, it was improperly
applied in Trask. The Trask court did not look to the particular facts of
that case and therefore overlooked the essence of the relationship. It
116. Some may argue that this was not an arm's length transaction because the plaintiff and the
client were related. However, there was no indication in the opinion that the client intended that the
attorney's representation benefit her mother or that she asked her attorney to ensure her mother's
interest in the property was secure.
117. 67 Wash. App. 901, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992), review denied, 121 Wash. 2d 1018, 854 P.2d 41
(1993).
118. While the modified multi-factor balancing test had not been established yet, it appears the
court in Harrington ignored the actual wording of the test and applied an intent-to-benefit standard.
119. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text. Fortunately, Bohn is the only case in which
a court actually took the words "intent to affect" at their literal meaning.
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further confused the test by discussing two new factors: the lack of
alternative remedies and the burden a finding of liability would impose
on the legal profession. t20
1. Intent To Benefit Should Be Analyzed Factually, Not as a Matter of
Law
Because the intent behind the attorney-client rela:ionship is so
important in determining attorney liability, a court should analyze the
factual basis of the relationship. Only then may the parties' true
intentions be reliably ascertained. There is no indication that the Trask
court actually looked to the facts to determine the intent of the attorney-
client relationship.' The opinion does not address who paid the legal
fees, the purpose of the retention, or whether a retainer detailing the
duties of the attorney was signed. Instead, it summarily determined as a
matter of law that where an attorney advises a personal representative
there is no intent to benefit, and therefore no duty to, the beneficiaries.'
Factual analysis of the attorney-client relationship is necessary
because intent varies with each relationship. If courts determine intent as
a matter of law, they will ignore facts that distinguis the intent of
different relationships. This will result in dismissals based on legal
determinations where, factually, an intent to benefit did ex:.st.
This is exactly what happened in Trask. The court ignored issues such
as whether the attorney represented his client in her capacity as a
fiduciary or as an individual. This fact is significant because, when hired
by a fiduciary in a general capacity, an attorney is retained to perform
120. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 845, 872 P.2d 1080, 1085 (1994).
121. But see Leipham v. Adams, 77 Wash. App. 827, 894 P.2d 576, review denied, 127 Wash. 2d
1022, 904 P.2d 1157 (1995) (intent to benefit determined factually). The Leipham court considered
many facts in determining the intent of the attorney-client relationship, includingY the purpose of the
retention, the services performed, and the actual words and actions of the attorr ey and client. Id. at
833-34, 894 P.2d at 579-80. Leipham and Trask are the only Washington cases to apply the
modified test.
122. Trask follows the majority view that a fiduciary's attorney owes a duty only to the fiduciary
and not the beneficiaries. E.g., Goldberg v. Frye, 266 Cal. Rptr. 483 (Ct. App. 1990); Neal v. Baker,
551 N.E.2d 704 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 555 N.E.2d 378 (III. 1990). For an annotated list
of cases discussing the duties of fiduciaries' lawyers to beneficiaries see American College of Trust
and Estate Counsel Foundation, ACTEC Commentaries on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J. 865, 892-97 (1994). For a critique of cases finding that no duty exists
between fiduciaries' attorneys and beneficiaries see Charles M. Bennett, When The Fiduciary's
Agent Errs-Who Pays The Bill--Fiduciary, Agent, or Beneficiary?, 28 Real Prop. Prob. & Tr. J.
429,472-76 (1993).
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services that benefit the fiduciary, the estate, and its beneficiaries.'23 The
attorney's duties include giving advice regarding the administration,
liabilities, and obligations of the estate. 24 By contrast, when hired to
represent the client as an individual, the attorney is retained to perform
services that benefit the fiduciary individually."2 These include services
such as negotiating the fiduciary's compensation or defending the
fiduciary against charges of maladministration.'26
In Trask, the attorney was first retained in a general capacity to
perform services for the benefit not only of the estate but of its
beneficiaries as well."2 7 The court ignored this fact. If it had looked to the
facts of the representation, it would have discovered that there was an
intent to benefit the beneficiary. Because the threshold inquiry of intent
to benefit was met, the case should not have been dismissed.
Although the holding in Trask was limited to estate administration, the
importance of factual analysis extends beyond such situations. Other
examples of fiduciary relationships where a factual analysis is crucial
include situations where an attorney represents trustees, partners vis-h-
vis other partners, spouses, legal guardians, or corporate directors and
officers vis-A-vis their corporation. In such situations, the court must look
to the actual nature of the relationship; that is, the court must consider
whether the attorney and client's intent was for the attorney to represent
the client individually or generally in a fiduciary capacity. 28
The need to review the facts of a relationship also exists in non-
fiduciary situations. For example, where relatives engage in a
transaction, such as in Bohn, there may or may not be an intent on the
part of one relative and that relative's attorney to benefit the other
123. American College of Trust and Estate Counsel Foundation, supra note 122, at 889-90.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 889-91.
126. Id. at 889-92.
127. Trask v. Butler, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 837, 872 P.2d 1080, 1082 (1994).
128. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & William W. Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on
the Model RPC § 1.3:108, at 78 (Supp. 1992). Examples of situations where a duty may arise include
representing a guardian, In re Fraser, 83 Wash. 2d 884, 523 P.2d 921 (1974) (after being "fired" by
guardian, lawyer correctly refused to withdraw as the ward's attorney until he could ensure the
ward's interests were adequately protected); representing a corporation, Fassihi v. Sommers,
Schwartz, Silver, Schwartz & Tyler, P.C., 309 N.W.2d 645 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (attorney
representing close corporation owed fiduciary duties to minority shareholder); representing a trustee,
Pierce v. Lyman, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 236 (Ct. App. 1991) (attorney liable to trust beneficiaries as aider
and abettor of trustee's tortious conduct); and representing a partner, Ronson v. Superior Court, 29
Cal. Rptr. 2d 268 (Ct. App. 1994) (attorney representing general partner may share duty of fair
dealing which general partner owes limited partners).
Washington Law Review
relative. If a court decides the intent of such a relationship as a matter of
law, the judgment will not be based on the actual intent of the parties,
and the case may be unjustly dismissed because the facts were ignored. 29
2. Threshold Standard Should Be Limited to Intent To Benefit
Most legal malpractice suits brought by non-clients under the multi-
factor balancing test are dismissed on summary judgme:at because the
threshold burden of showing an intent to benefit the plaintiff has not
been met. 3 Therefore, to clarify the standard that plaintiffs must meet
for summary judgment, it is important that courts specif. exactly what
that standard is and how it can be met. When applying the new modified
test, the Trask court stated that the threshold inquiry for determining
whether an attorney owes a duty to non-clients is whether there was an
intent to benefit that party in the attorney-client relationship.' But,
without explanation, the Trask court also analyzed two other factors--the
availability of alternative remedies and the burden a finding of liability
would have on the legal profession.'32 The court was unclear as to the
role these two factors play in the threshold analysis. It failed to explain
whether each is a separate threshold that must be met or whether they are
balanced with the intent-to-benefit factor. Regardless, these additional
factors are inappropriate initial considerations under the multi-factor
balancing test.
a. Availability of Remedies Is Ineffective as an Initial Inquiry
In addition to applying the intent-to-benefit standard, the Trask court
considered whether alternative remedies were available to the plaintiff.'33
It found that there were.'34 As a beneficiary of the estate, the plaintiff
could have sued the personal representative directly. He also could have
requested a judicial proceeding to direct the personal representative to
129. The author is not arguing that the question of intent must go to a jury but merely that it is a
factual, not a legal issue. If the facts are unclear at a summary judgment stage, summary judgment
should not be granted.
130. See, e.g., Trask, 123 Wash. 2d 835, 872 P.2d 1080; Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96
(111. 1982); Page v. Frazier, 445 N.E.2d 148 (Mass. 1983).
131. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 843, 872 P.2d at 1084.
132. Id. at 843-45, 872 P.2d at 1084-85.
133. Id. at 843-44, 872 P.2d at 1084-85.
134. Id.
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abstain from breaching her fiduciary duty or to have her removed.'35 The
court reasoned that, because alternative remedies existed, there was no
need to hold the attorney liable for his negligence. 3 In analyzing the
availability of alternative remedies, the court did not clarify whether it
was referring to theoretical remedies or practical remedies. 37
Regardless of which was considered, neither is an appropriate
threshold. Consideration of alternative practical remedies as opposed to
alternative theoretical remedies is a superfluous and unnecessary inquiry
that will only increase the cost and time spent on litigating attorney
malpractice suits. On the other hand, considering either alternative
practical or theoretical remedies fails to focus on the actions which give
rise to the claim. No incentive will be given to attorneys to act in a non-
negligent manner.
Threshold inquiries work to weed out unworthy claims. If every case
can pass through a threshold, the standard is ineffective. For example, a
threshold inquiry into the lack of alternative practical remedies would
almost always be satisfied. If such remedies existed, the non-client
generally would have pursued them first before suing the attorney
directly. Only after such remedies failed, or practically did not exist, such
as where the client does not have the money to satisfy a judgment, would
the non-client sue the attorney directly. This is because the theories
imposing duties on attorneys to non-clients are relatively new and
unpredictable. 8 A third-party injured through the attorney-client
relationship, for example, would have a much stronger and more
predictable cause of action directly against the client based on
established legal theories.
In addition, such a threshold inquiry also will unnecessarily increase
the time and money spent on such cases. The findings required by this
factor, such as whether the client actually is capable of satisfying a
judgment, are fact based. Additional discovery, costs, and time would be
required to establish this factor. It would be more efficient to reserve
such expense until after an intent to benefit is established. If no intent to
135. Id., 872 P.2d at 1085. Such actions are authorized by Washington statute. Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 11.28.250, .68.070, .96.070(2) (1994).
136. Trask, 123 Wash. 2d at 844, 872 P.2d at 1085.
137. By use of the term "practical remedies," the author is referring to remedies available both
legally and practically. For example, this term would encompass a situation where a cause of action
exists and the adverse party has funds to pay the judgment. When referring to "theoretical remedies,"
the author is referring to remedies available at law irrespective of whether the adverse party is
actually able to provide the remedy.
138. See H. Robert Fiebach, Expanding the Plaintiff Pool, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995, at 76.
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benefit exists, the time and expense of establishing this factor will be
saved.
An alternative remedies threshold, whether theoretical or practical, is
also inappropriate because the court's focus should be on the attorney's
actions that gave rise to the claim. By focusing on whether the injured
party has a remedy, the test will not deter attorney negligence and will
act as a shield protecting attorneys from liability. Attorneys, like the
court in Trask, will focus on the status of those affected by their actions.
If an attorney knows that alternative remedies are available to non-
clients, there is less incentive for that attorney to use a heightened
standard of care in issuing advice. This standard would, in effect, shield
attorneys who are negligent but know that alternative remedies exist,
thereby encouraging attorneys to be less careful in some situations.
One such example is where an attorney's client is wealthy and capable
of paying damages. In a situation like that in Bohn, if the client had the
means to repay the loan to the plaintiff, the attorney would know that he
would not be liable for a breach of a duty of care because alternative
remedies would be available to the plaintiff. Another example is the
attorney who offers the same advice in different legal contexts--one
where alternative theoretical remedies are available and tae other where
they are not. If an attorney negligently interpreted a will drafted for a
client, and after the client's death the beneficiaries sued the attorney, the
attorney would be liable because the beneficiaries would have no
alternative theoretical remedies; they could not sue the client or the
estate. If, however, the same negligent interpretation was given to a
personal representative who then acted based on that advice and was
sued by the beneficiaries, the attorney would not be liable to the
beneficiaries. The beneficiaries could sue the personal representative
directly and therefore would have an alternative theoreticalremedy.
By focusing on the position of the injured party and no: on the actions
giving rise to the claim, this threshold factor in effect gives attorneys
permission to behave negligently by making it more difficult to recover
remedies against them in certain situations.
b. Burden on the Legal Profession Is Too Complex To Be a Threshold
Consideration
The second extraneous inquiry the Trask court considered after
determining that the intent-to-benefit factor was not met was the burden
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that a finding of liability would place on the legal profession.'39 Although
this is supposed to be balanced in the multi-factor test, the Trask court
singled out this factor and discussed it as part of the threshold
determination. However, if courts include undue burden in the threshold
determination, they will be forced to consider all the elements of the
multi-factor balancing test 4 ' at the threshold stage.
Numerous courts and legal scholars have examined the increased
burden placed on the legal profession by expanded attorney liability.
Opinions vary greatly as to how much of a burden is undue.'41 Some
members of the legal community fear that expanding attorney liability
will undermine the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client and will threaten
attorney-client confidentiality.'42 Others argue that the burden on the
legal profession is slight compared to the unredressed injuries suffered
by non-clients who, they believe, generally are less blameworthy than
the negligent attorney and less capable of spreading the costs of attorney
negligence. 43
A dispute that implicates such a broad range of issues is more
appropriately addressed as part of the overall balancing test rather than at
a threshold stage. In determining who should shoulder the burden of the
loss suffered, the court must not only weigh the specific facts of the case,
but also important issues of public policy. To thoroughly analyze
whether the burden on the profession is undue, the court will have to
address questions including the nature of the action, the degree of harm
caused, the foreseeability of such harm, and the policies of preventing
139. The court stated that unresolvable conflicts of interests would arise on the part of the
attorney in deciding whether to represent the personal representative, the estate, or the heirs and that
these conflicts would detract from the attorney's ethical obligations to his client. 123 Wash. 2d at
844, 872 P.2d at 1085. However, the majority of an attorney's representation of a personal
representative does not involve adversarial actions between a personal representative and a
beneficiary. The attorney is hired to facilitate the personal representative's service to the beneficiary.
Furthermore, conflicts arising from possible adversarial situations can be avoided by simply
explaining to the personal representative the duties that an attorney also owes the estate and
beneficiaries. The attorney, at the outset of the representation, can discuss with the personal
representative what steps would be necessary in the event a conflict arose. Simply asking attorneys
to explain their role to their clients is not a large burden on the legal profession. See generally
American Bar Association, Section of Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Report of the Special
Study Committee on Professional Responsibility: Counseling the Fiduciary, 28 Real Prop. Prob. &
Tr. J. 825, 833-37 (1994).
140. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Cifii, supra note'37, at 1; Ellen S. Eisenberg, Attorneys' Negligence and Third
Parties, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 126 (1982).
142. See Cifu, supra note 37, at I.
143. See Eisenberg, supra note 141, at 126-27.
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future harm. In other words, the court will have to address the other
factors in the balancing test. To keep the threshold inquiry effective in
limiting the number of colorable cases and narrow enough so that the
whole case is not argued on summary judgment, the threshold inquiry
must be limited to determining whether an intent to benefit existed.
IV. CONCLUSION
Washington has made a great contribution to the field of attorney
malpractice liability to third parties. Improving on the California test, it
clarified that the multi-factor balancing test only applies to those
situations where there was not merely an intent to affect, but an intent to
benefit the non-client. This test makes it clear that an attorney cannot
owe a duty of care to a client's adversary for legal malpractice. Such a
duty, if imposed, would completely transform the role attorneys play in
protecting and advising their clients. However, there are several other
aspects of the new test that must be clarified and improved. Washington
courts should look to the facts of the attorney-client relationship in
determining the intent of that relationship and not decide intent as a
matter of law. Furthermore, the courts must ensure that the threshold test
does not force the parties to go through the time and expense of
establishing a factor that generally will be satisfied. The initial inquiry
must be sufficiently narrow so that the threshold stage acts as an efficient
gateway and not as the impetus for consideration of the whole cause of
action. Therefore, the courts should limit the initial inqu:.ry to intent to
benefit and not include the additional Trask factors concerning the
availability of alternative remedies or the burden on the legal profession.
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